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The cost of business cycles and the benefits of stabilization
Introduction and summary
During the past half century, policymakers in the U.S.
have consistently sought to chart a stable course for
economic growth. The importance accorded to this
goal does not merely owe to the views of select poli-
cymakers, but is mandated by law. In 1946, Congress
passed the Employment Act, which encouraged the
federal government to adopt policies that would lead
to maximum employment and price stability. Evidently
dissatisfied with the fulfillment of these goals, some
30 years later Congress passed the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act in 1978 (also known as the
Humphrey–Hawkins Act after its two coauthors), which
strengthened the original Employment Act. Among
other things, the 1978 law mandated that the Federal
Reserve should specifically aim to maintain econom-
ic growth in line with the economy’s potential to ex-
pand. That is, policymakers were instructed to steer
the economy in such a way as to ensure steady out-
put growth, fast enough to maintain full employment
but not so fast as to ignite inflation.
In stark challenge to the conventional wisdom
that inspired such legislation, Robert Lucas argued in
his influential 1987 monograph Models of Business
Cycles that deviations from stable growth over the
post-WWII (postwar) period in the United States were
actually a minor concern that did not merit the high
priority accorded to them under the law. More pre-
cisely, Lucas asked how much individuals should be
willing to give up in principle to live in a world not
subject to the degree of macroeconomic volatility the
U.S. witnessed during this period. Assuming prefer-
ences that many economists view as a reasonable
benchmark, he calculated that individuals would sac-
rifice at most 0.1 percent of lifetime consumption,
prompting him to conclude that there would be little
benefit to “devising ever more subtle policies to re-
move the residual amount of business cycle risk.”
Not surprisingly, Lucas’s results have attracted quite
some controversy, and various researchers have revisit-
ed his calculation since his monograph was published.
This article reviews the literature prompted by Lucas’s
original observation, with an emphasis on two ques-
tions. First, does the subsequent literature confirm that
postwar macroeconomic volatility is as minor a prob-
lem as Lucas’s original calculation suggests? And sec-
ond, what do these estimates tell us about the inherent
benefits from further pursuing stabilization policy?1
I argue that the work that followed Lucas’s origi-
nal calculation suggests his estimate significantly un-
derstates the true cost of postwar macroeconomic
volatility. But at the same time, the mere fact that post-
war business cycles were costly need not imply that
attempting to neutralize them would have been high-
ly desirable; that depends on what shocks were respon-
sible for this volatility and whether they could have
been effectively offset, questions economists have yet
to fully resolve. As such, Lucas’s conclusion that there
was little to gain from more aggressive stabilization
may be correct. But even if there is little benefit from
further stabilization, it need not follow that macro-
economic stabilization per se is unimportant. Society
might have been much worse off had policymakers
not pursued stabilization to the extent they did during
the postwar era, and avoiding even greater volatility
over this period should have ranked as a high priority.
The original Lucas calculation
In calculating the cost of business cycles,
Lucas (1987) reasoned that people’s concern about33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
macroeconomic fluctuations is primarily due to how
these fluctuations affect the amount of goods and ser-
vices they get to consume. He then argued that we can
view aggregate consumption expenditures each year
as the amount of resources that can be used to satisfy
such needs.2 Since aggregate consumption expendi-
tures fluctuate over the business cycle, Lucas attrib-
uted the cost of business cycles to the fact that
individuals are forced to contend with volatile and
unpredictable consumption rather than stable and
predictable consumption growth.
To be more precise, Lucas assumed consumption
can be decomposed into a part that grows systemati-
cally over time and a part that fluctuates with prevailing
economic conditions. Let us refer to the systematic
part as trend consumption and denote its value in year
t by 
*. t C  Actual consumption in year t, denoted Ct, will
deviate from trend by a random percentage ε t, that is,
()
* 1. tt t CC =+ ε
The random deviation ε t is assumed to have a zero
mean and to be independent across time. That is,
consumption Ct will be equal to trend consumption
*
t C  on average, although in any given year it may be
higher or lower than the trend, independent of what
happened to consumption in previous years. Figure 1
shows log per-capita consumption from 1948 to the
present, together with an estimate for trend consump-
tion 
*
t C  as Lucas suggested constructing it.3
Lucas further assumed that the way
individuals value consumption can be
summarized with a simple utility func-
tion that assigns a value to every se-
quence of consumption expenditures
{Ct, Ct+1, Ct+2, ...}. Let U(Ct, Ct+1, ...)
denote the value a typical individual
assigns to the corresponding consump-
tion sequence. To quantify the cost of
volatility, Lucas asked by what fraction
we would need to increase lifetime con-
sumption to make an individual with
this utility function just as happy as in a
world where consumption never deviated
from trend, that is, where the individual
could consume 
*
t C  each year. Formally,
Lucas calculated the value of µ for which
() () ( ) ()
**
11 1 , 1 ,... , ,... . tt t t UCCU C C ++ +µ +µ =
The exact details of Lucas’s calcula-
tion are provided in box 1. Under his
assumptions, the cost of business cycles can be ap-




ε µ = γσ
where γ  measures how averse an individual is toward
risk and 
2
ε σ  denotes the variance of deviations from
trend consumption. Thus, business cycles are more
costly the more volatile is consumption (that is, the
higher is 
2
ε σ ) and the more averse individuals are to
consumption volatility (that is, the higher is γ ).
Using empirically plausible values for γ  and
2, ε σ  Lucas arrived at a cost of 0.008 percent. That is,
individuals would be willing to sacrifice no more
than one-hundredth of 1 percent of their consumption
to achieve macroeconomic stability. While acknowl-
edging that his calculation abstracts from many im-
portant issues, Lucas argued it was unlikely that the
cost of macroeconomic volatility would exceed 0.1
percent. A quick glance at figure 1 reveals why: Since
aggregate consumption is not especially volatile, Ct
and 
*
t C  are not dramatically different, and individu-
als will be close to indifferent between the two paths.
In the next few sections, I discuss the ways sub-
sequent authors have criticized the above calculation.
These are summarized in table 1 on page 34. The table
is organized according to which feature of Lucas’s
calculation each article modifies, and provides the range
of cost estimates each paper presents as plausible.
FIGURE 1
Log consumption per capita, 1948–2003
Stabilization corresponds to smoothing consumption
Sources: Consumption data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
population data from the Census Bureau.
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Alternative ways of implementing
Lucas’s calculation
Even if one accepts the approach that un-
derlies Lucas’s calculation, it is still possible
to quibble with the particular assumptions
Lucas used to arrive at his estimate. I begin
by reviewing criticisms that are in this spirit.
One problem concerns the particular
function U(•) Lucas used. Although this utili-
ty function is common in applied macroeco-
nomics and has some empirical support, it has
a difficult time accounting for attitudes toward
certain types of risks, and as such might under-
state how much individuals dislike consump-
tion risk. For example, individuals whose
preferences correspond to Lucas’s assump-
tions would be quite willing to invest in risky
equity, while the large premium on stocks
over bonds suggests that in practice individu-
als are more risk averse given they require a
hefty return to invest in equity. One way to
fix this is to allow for a higher degree of risk
aversion. For example, whereas Lucas focused
on the case where γ  = 1, Obstfeld (1994) and
Dolmas (1998) argue that a value of γ  as high
as 20 may be plausible, which would increase
the costs relative to those Lucas reported by a
factor of 20; but since the cost Lucas calculat-
ed was so small, the implied cost of business
cycles is still no more than 0.5 percent of life-
time consumption. Both authors also consider
a more general utility function advocated by
Epstein and Zin (1991) that can be more easi-
ly reconciled with data on asset prices. This
alternative specification suggests consumption
volatility is not very costly, unless fluctuations
in consumption are highly persistent, which
for reasons I discuss below may not correspond
to what we usually think of as business cycle
volatility.
Tallarini (2000) uses the same general-
ized utility from Epstein and Zin (1991), but
argues that far greater values of risk aversion
are needed to accord with the premium on
risky equity. As a result, he estimates the cost
of business cycles to be much larger, between
2 percent and 12 percent of lifetime consump-
tion.4 Pemberton (1996) and Dolmas (1998)
consider a different utility specification known
as first-order risk aversion. The implied cost
of business cycles for this specification is only
slightly larger than the one Obstfeld and
Dolmas report and, for reasonable parameter36 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
values, does not exceed 1 percent of lifetime consump-
tion. Otrok (2001) proposes still another specifica-
tion for utility, but finds that plausible parameter
values yield even more negligible costs.
Thus, most of the papers that propose alternative
utility formulations continue to find small costs of
business cycles, although a few argue the costs are
significantly larger. So which of these specifications
best captures individual preferences? Fortunately,
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) developed an approach
that does not require imposing a utility function, but
infers one indirectly from a variety of asset prices,
including the return on equity.5 They argue that asset
prices reveal that individuals strongly dislike fluctua-
tions in trend consumption growth, not cyclical fluc-
tuations in consumption. To appreciate this point,
consider figure 1. The growth rate of trend consump-
tion 
*
t C  varies over time: Per capita consumption
grew at roughly 3 percent per year in the 1960s, com-
pared with about 2 percent per year in the remaining
postwar period. Alvarez and Jermann infer that the
reason individuals require a high premium to hold
stocks is that the return on stocks tended to be low in
BOX 1
Lucas’s calculation




t CC =λ  where λ  > 1 measures the average growth rate for con-
sumption during the post-WWII period. Actual consumption Ct is then set equal to ()
* 1, tt C +ε  where (1 + ε t )
for all t are independent and identically distributed lognormal random variables with mean 1 and variance σ 2.
The standard deviation σ  can be computed from the standard deviation of  ()
* ln / . tt t CC≈ε  Rather than esti-
mate a trend, consistent with his specification for 
*. t C  Lucas used the Hodrick–Prescott filter of aggregate
consumption as his measure for 
*, t C  from which he estimated σ   = 1.3%.
















=β  −γ  ∑
Here, β  denotes the rate at which utility is discounted over time and γ  is equal to the coefficient of relative
risk-aversion, that is, the higher is γ , the more reluctant the individual is to face a volatile consumption path.
Lucas sets β  to 0.95 and γ  to 1, parameters that many macroeconomists would view as reasonable bench-





−γ  reduces to ln Ct.
A little algebra reveals that the solution to the equation














    +µ +ε βλ βλ     =β  −γ −γ
 
∑∑
yields the approximate formula µ = ½ γσ 2. For the coefficient of relative risk-aversion, the implied cost is thus
µ = ½ (1)(0.013)2 = 0.00008, that is, less than one-hundredth of 1 percent.
those periods when trend consumption growth was
low. But the fact that households are so concerned
with slow trend growth does not mean they are equal-
ly alarmed about temporary deviations from trend.
Indeed, Alvarez and Jermann calculate that individu-
als would be willing to sacrifice at most 0.3 percent
of lifetime consumption to eliminate only business
cycle volatility in consumption, although they would
sacrifice a lot more to avoid fluctuations in trend con-
sumption growth. The preferences that are most con-
sistent with data on asset prices therefore suggest the
cost of business cycles is fairly small.
Another objection to Lucas’s calculation concerns
his assumptions regarding deviations from trend con-
sumption. Lucas assumed that the fact that consump-
tion is below trend this year says nothing about whether
it will be above or below trend next year. In practice,
though, if consumption is below trend this year it is
also likely to be below trend next year. Depending
on how persistent shocks are and which utility func-
tion one assumes, this can affect the implied cost of
consumption volatility. As evident in table 1, even if
shocks are likely to persist for several years, the cost37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of business cycles is typically less than 1 percent for
most utility specifications. But when Obstfeld (1994)
assumes shocks are permanent, so a fall in consump-
tion today is expected to persist indefinitely, he finds
that the cost of cycles can be as much as 1.8 percent.
Dolmas (1998) shows that the cost of business cycles
can be even larger—over 20 percent of lifetime con-
sumption—when shocks are permanent and individuals
have preferences that exhibit first-order risk aversion.
Yet these permanent shocks are essentially changes
in trend consumption growth, which presumably re-
flect changes in the economy’s potential, rather than
temporary deviations from trend that policymakers
can try to offset. The fact that the cost of permanent
fluctuations in consumption can be so large thus mir-
rors the findings of Alvarez and Jermann that what
individuals particularly dislike are fluctuations in trend
consumption. Although society would be much bet-
ter off if these permanent shocks were avoided, this
is not a cost that could be avoided by conventional
stabilization policy.
Using individual-level data: Preliminary
results
A potentially more compelling criticism of Lucas’s
estimate concerns its reliance on aggregate data. To
see why using aggregate data might be problematic,
suppose there was a small fraction of the population
whose consumption was highly volatile, while con-
sumption for everyone else was constant. Average
consumption across the entire population would not
appear very volatile; but for the unlucky few whose
consumption is volatile, fluctuations will be quite
costly. More generally, suppose that the small declines
in aggregate consumption during recessions are driv-
en by large declines in the consumption of a small
but randomly chosen number of individuals, reflect-
ing the fact that it is hard to predict exactly where the
effects of downturns will be most severe. Since any
individual runs the risk of a dramatic fall in his con-
sumption, eliminating cyclical fluctuations might make
all individuals much better off. In essence, focusing
on aggregate consumption understates the volatility
of consumption 
2
ε σ  that individuals face and, as such,
understates the cost of business cycles.
Unfortunately, there is no time series on con-
sumption at the level of households with which to
carry out Lucas’s calculation.6 Instead, estimates of
the cost of business cycles based on household data
rely on more readily available observations on earn-
ings. More precisely, researchers use individual earn-
ings data to estimate a stochastic income process for
a typical household, and then use theory to predict
the consumption of a household facing this income
process. They then calculate the cost of business cy-
cles from the household’s predicted as opposed to
actual consumption.
An important assumption in this line of work is
that credit markets are “incomplete,” that is, that credit
markets provide only limited protection against in-
come risk. Households facing volatile incomes would
naturally try to borrow when their incomes are low to
maintain a constant level of consumption. Such bor-
rowing will not allow them to escape consumption
volatility altogether, since in recessions there will be
more low-income households that wish to borrow and
fewer high-income households willing to lend, rais-
ing interest rates and making it too costly to keep con-
sumption constant. Still, with unlimited access to credit,
one can show that individuals will be able to limit
the volatility of their consumption to that of aggregate
consumption, in which case Lucas’s original calcula-
tion would be applicable. But his calculation would
not be applicable if households were limited in their
borrowing, as is often the case in practice.
Formally, let yt denote the annual labor income
for a given individual in year t. We begin by construct-
ing a stochastic income process whose realizations
mimic the incomes we observe for different households.
For example, suppose income fluctuations were pri-
marily due to periodic episodes of unemployment.
We can then capture income fluctuations with a simple
process whereby the income of an individual house-
hold can take on two values, one that corresponds to
the average earnings of employed workers and one
that corresponds to the average earnings of unemployed
workers (for example, unemployment benefits). We
can then estimate the transition probabilities between
employment and unemployment from individual ob-
servations. A more sophisticated approach would also
take into account the possibility that workers earn more
on their jobs in boom times than they do in recessions.
Let at denote the net value of the individual’s as-
set holdings in year t, and let rt denote the interest
rate paid on assets held between year t and year t + 1.
Likewise, let ct denote the individual’s consumption
expenditures in year t. Individuals are assumed to
choose consumption expenditures to maximize utility
U(ct, ct+1, ...), given the process for yt and subject to
the constraint that at+1 = (1 + rt)at + yt – ct. This con-
straint states that the value of the assets an individual
has at the beginning of year t + 1 is just the sum of
the value of the assets he held in year t, the interest he
earned on these assets, and the wage income he earned,
minus whatever he spent on purchases in year t. To
capture the limited ability of households to borrow,38 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
we can add the restriction that at ≥  0 for all t, that is,
individuals are not allowed to carry any debt. A weaker
restriction would allow for some amount of debt, so
the lower bound on assets would be a negative number
rather than zero. Solving this maximization problem
yields a predicted sequence for consumption {ct, ct+1, ...}.
Next, we use economic theory to forecast how the
income process would change once aggregate fluctu-
ations are stabilized. Denote the process for income in
a stable world by {}
**
1 ,, . . . , tt yy +  so an asterisk denotes
the value of a variable once aggregate fluctuations are
eliminated. Once again, we can solve for the consump-
tion decisions 
**
1 , ,... tt cc +  of an individual facing the
constraints 
** * * * *
1 (1 ) and 0. + =+ + − ≥ tt t t t t ar a y c a  Given
the two consumption paths, we can once again ask how
much we need to increase consumption in the world
with volatility to make an individual as happy as
when aggregate volatility is eliminated, that is, what
value of µ would ensure  1... ((1 ) ,(1 ) ) tt Ucc + +µ +µ =
**
1... (, ) . tt Cc c +
The various papers that pursue this hypothesis
differ in how they each chose to model the income
process 
*. t y  Atkeson and Phelan (1994) argue that
as long as income while employed and income while
unemployed do not vary with the business cycle, the
income process 
*
t y  should be identical to yt. To see
why, suppose the probability an individual will be
unemployed is 3 percent in a boom and 9 percent in
a recession and that each year is equally likely to be
a recession or a boom. From an individual’s perspec-
tive, then, the probability of being unemployed in
some year in the future is ½ × 3% + ½ × 9% = 6%.
Now, consider a stabilization policy where the gov-
ernment hires workers in recessions but not in booms
to keep the probability of being unemployed constant
at 6 percent. Each worker now faces the same earn-
ings risk once as before, namely a 6 percent probability
of being unemployed in any given year. But this does
not mean individuals are not affected by stabilization.
Without government intervention, demand for borrow-
ing will be higher in recessions when more people are
unemployed and, consequently, the equilibrium inter-
est rate rt will be higher as well. By contrast, in the
stable environment, the interest rate 
*
t r  will be con-
stant over time. Stabilization thus eliminates variations
in the rate at which an individual can borrow or lend.
For this reason, the consumption choices 
*
t c  in the
stable economy may differ from ct. But when Atkeson
and Phelan ask how much individuals would need to
be as happy as when they get to consume 
*, t c  the an-
swer is only 0.02 percent of lifetime consumption.
By contrast, Imrohoroglu (1989) argues that sta-
bilization does affect earnings risk, although at the same
time she ignores the interest rate risk that Atkeson and
Phelan emphasize. Her argument relies on the obser-
vation that unemployment spells are typically short
in booms but long in recessions, whereas in a stable
environment unemployment durations would presum-
ably be of average length. The virtue of stabilization
is that it allows individuals to avoid long spells of
unemployment, which are hard to save for.7 While
stabilization also eliminates short unemployment spells,
borrowing-constrained households do not suffer as
much from eliminating short spells as they benefit from
eliminating long ones. When Imrohoroglu computes
the cost of business cycles assuming individuals can-
not borrow and earn zero real interest on their savings,
she finds a cost of business cycles of 0.3 percent. When
she also allows individuals to borrow at a real rate of
8 percent (while saving at a rate of zero), the cost falls
to a mere 0.05 percent. While her analysis ignores
fluctuations in the interest rate over the cycle, recall
that Atkeson and Phelan find these to be negligible.
Thus, preliminary work on the cost of business cycles
with incomplete markets appeared to reaffirm Lucas’s
original conclusion.
More recent work using individual-level data
More recent work, however, has questioned this
conclusion. The reason for the small cost of business
cycles above is that interest rates are not particularly
volatile over the cycle, nor are unemployment spells
in the U.S. very long, even in recessions. Since house-
holds could easily save enough to sustain them through
short periods of unemployment, the papers cited above
conclude that business cycles are not especially cost-
ly. Yet there are two problems with this conclusion.
First, fluctuations can contribute to earnings risk be-
yond just unemployment risk. For example, since wages
are procyclical, workers who are laid off in recessions
will re-enter the work force at lower wages that may
remain low for far longer than the duration of a typical
unemployment spell. Second, even though individuals
could save for bad times, evidence on the distribution
of wealth suggests a significant number of them do not.
More recent work has taken these observations into
account and suggests more significant costs of busi-
ness cycles.
Consider first the work of Krusell and Smith
(2002).8 They allow the interest rate rt to vary over
the cycle, so individuals face interest rate risk as de-
scribed by Atkeson and Phelan (1994). At the same
time, they follow Imrohoroglu (1989) in assuming
that stabilization will allow individuals to avoid long
spells of unemployment. But they also introduce two
new features: 1) they assume stabilization has a more39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
significant effect on earnings risk than in Imrohoroglu’s
formulation, in line with empirical evidence; and 2)
they modify the model to accord with the observation
that a considerable fraction of all households hold
very little wealth.
Turning first to the effects of stabilization on earn-
ings risk, Krusell and Smith incorporate Imrohoroglu’s
observation that stabilization allows individuals to
avoid long spells of unemployment. But they intro-
duce two additional features. First, they assume that
the wages households earn while employed vary over
the cycle but would remain constant under stabiliza-
tion, so 
*
t y  would be less volatile than yt even for
households that avoid unemployment. Second, they
assume stabilization lowers the risk of becoming un-
employed. This can be motivated by the observation
that some jobs that are profitable in booms turn un-
profitable in recessions. Workers employed on those
jobs would earn high wages in booms, but would be
immediately laid off in the next recession. If these
jobs remain profitable after stabilization, workers on
these jobs would no longer have to fear unemploy-
ment from a downturn. However, workers would
earn lower wages on these jobs under stabilization,
since they would no longer earn the high wages they
used to earn in booms.
In addition to changing the way stabilization
affects earnings risk, Krusell and Smith modify
Imrohoroglu’s model to accord with evidence on the
distribution of wealth across households, specifically
with the observation that wealth is highly concentrated.
To do this, they allow for heterogeneity in discount
rates across individuals. Households that are more
patient save more and, as such, account for a dispro-
portionate share of total wealth. Similarly, households
that are more impatient hold very little wealth. While
this leaves them vulnerable to periods of low consump-
tion while unemployed, they are too impatient to cut
back on their current consumption and save for when
their income is low. By choosing the distribution of
discount rates appropriately, Krusell and Smith are
able to reconcile their model with the empirical dis-
tribution of wealth.
For households that are unemployed and have
exhausted their borrowing capacity, Krusell and Smith
estimate that eliminating fluctuations would be worth
almost 4 percent of lifetime consumption. However,
the cost of fluctuations for other individuals in the
economy is much smaller and even negative for
households with moderate savings (these households
are not concerned about earnings volatility given their
savings, and they like the fact that in the cyclical en-
vironment, wages are high precisely when they are
more likely to be employed). Wealthy households do
have a strong preference for stabilization, although
this has nothing to do with volatility directly; rather,
eliminating fluctuations would lead other households
to cut back their precautionary savings, causing the
supply of loanable funds to shrink and interest rates
to rise, which obviously benefits those with high levels
of assets. On the whole, Krusell and Smith find that
the majority of households would be made worse off
under stabilization, and averaging over all individu-
als implies business cycles are socially beneficial on
net, although mildly so. As such, their findings hard-
ly point to stabilization as a pressing social concern.
But their results do illustrate that business cycles are
costly for households with few assets.
Subsequent work has argued that Krusell and
Smith themselves understate the degree of earnings
risk individuals face. For example, although Krusell
and Smith allow wages to fluctuate over the cycle,
the degree to which they let wages vary with economic
conditions depends on the predictions of a model rather
than on direct evidence on earnings. When Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2001) look at reported household
earnings, they find that the standard deviation of earnings
across households more than doubles in recessions,
far more than implied by Krusell and Smith’s model.
Moreover, Storesletten et al. find that earnings shocks
are highly persistent, so that when a household’s in-
come falls this year, for whatever reason, its earnings
are likely to be low for far longer than in Krusell and
Smith’s model. Using the same utility function Lucas
considered, Storesletten et al. estimate that eliminat-
ing fluctuations would be worth 0.6 percent of life-
time consumption, while households with little savings
(which in their model are young households that have
yet to accumulate any wealth) would be willing to
sacrifice 1.5 percent of their consumption. For some-
what higher degrees of risk aversion, but still within
the range Lucas considered, they estimate the cost for
the population as a whole at 2.5 percent of lifetime
consumption, while those without any savings would
be willing to sacrifice 7.4 percent.
Although Storesletten et al. assume earnings shocks
are highly persistent, households can still protect them-
selves fairly well against these shocks by saving. This
is because earnings are persistent, but not permanent.9
Krebs (2003) considers a similar model where shocks
are permanent, so a fall in income today will lead ex-
pected income in all future years to fall by the same
amount. In this case, individuals will not be able to
borrow to offset negative shocks to their income, even
when credit markets operate perfectly; after all, who
would lend to an individual to cover earnings losses40 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
that are never expected to be recovered? Krebs esti-
mates that, overall, individuals with the same prefer-
ences as Lucas assumed would be willing to sacrifice
7.5 percent of lifetime consumption to eliminate fluctu-
ations in this case. But it is hard to tell from the data
whether earnings shocks are permanent or just highly
persistent, and the cost of cycles is considerably smaller
in the latter case.10
Beaudry and Pages (2001) also consider the case
where individuals do not protect themselves against
earnings shocks. However, rather than allow for per-
manent shocks, they assume that individuals have no
incentive to save at the equilibrium interest rate.
Moreover, rather than estimating earnings volatility
from evidence on earnings dispersion as Storesletten
et al. and Krebs do, they use data on the cyclicality
of starting wages. Their logic is that, just as in earlier
work, layoffs contribute to much of the earnings risk
individuals face. However, unlike previous work, this
is not because of the earnings workers forego while
unemployed, but because laid-off workers typically
re-enter the work force at a lower wage than they
previously earned. While it is never a good thing to
be laid off and have to start from scratch, it is partic-
ularly bad if you have to do so in a recession. They
calibrate their model to data on the volatility of start-
ing salaries over the cycle and, using Lucas’s original
utility function, estimate that individuals would be
willing to sacrifice 1.4 percent of consumption to elimi-
nate fluctuations in starting salaries over the cycle. When
they allow for more risk aversion as in Storesletten et
al., they estimate a cost of 4.4 percent. However, this
cost is only borne by workers; employers in their model
are assumed not to care about volatility, and the im-
plied cost of business cycles for the population as a
whole is smaller.11
In sum, once we take into account evidence on
the low savings rates of many households, as well as
the fact that cyclical fluctuations can lead to persistent
earnings declines, postwar business cycles start to mat-
ter; specifically, there is a core of households that are
disinclined to save and as such would be willing to
sacrifice between as much as 4 percent and 7 percent
of lifetime consumption to avoid such volatility. Re-
maining households are likely to suffer less from cycli-
cal fluctuations and may even benefit from them. The
overall cost of cycles is thus more modest, but can still
run as much as 2.5 percent of lifetime consumption.
The effects of volatility on the level
of consumption
A separate problem with Lucas’s calculation is
his assumption on how stabilization affects the level
of consumption. Lucas asserted that stabilization would
eliminate deviations from trend, implying consump-
tion would revert to its average level. But as various
economists have since noted, the level of consump-
tion might change in response to stabilization, so that
stabilization might increase average consumption rel-
ative to the volatile economy.
The papers described in the previous section us-
ing household income data are immune to this criti-
cism, since they derive consumption 
*
t c  as the solution
to a household problem rather than setting it to the
average of observed consumption. However, they still
abstract from some of the ways that stabilization can
affect the level of consumption, and as such can still
understate the true cost of business cycles. As in most
of the literature that explores this hypothesis, my dis-
cussion will focus on aggregate data.
One critique along these lines comes from DeLong
and Summers (1988). They argue that rather than
steadying economic activity at its average level, sta-
bilization would prevent economic activity from falling
below its maximum potential, in line with the man-
dates of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978. Thus, stabilization policy would “fill in
troughs without shaving off the peaks.” While their dis-
cussion is couched in terms of output, one can easily
adapt their argument for consumption. Let 
*
t C  denote
the level of consumption that would prevail in year t
in the counterfactually stable economy. Previously, 
*
t C
also reflected the average of consumption; but now
the two series are no longer assumed to be the same.
Let ε t denote the percent deviation of actual consump-
tion in year t from 
*, t C i.e., 
* (1 ) . tt t CC =+ ε   If consump-
tion in the stable economy represents the maximum
level consumption can attain, ε t must be less than or
equal to zero. The average value of ε t is therefore nega-
tive, as opposed to zero. Consequently, the consump-
tion path in the stable economy 
*
t C  exceeds the average
level of consumption in the volatile economy.
Just as Lucas used the assumption that ε t is zero on
average to recover 
*
t C  from data on  ( )
* 1, tt t CC =+ ε
DeLong and Summers propose a way to recover 
*
t C
from Ct when ε t ≤  0. Their approach is described in
box 2. Alternatively, we can use data on business cy-
cle peaks to isolate years when ε t = 0, and then inter-
polate between these points to recover 
*. t C  In particular,
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
has attempted to identify peaks and troughs in eco-
nomic activity ever since 1850, which we can use to
identify years in which ε t was equal to 0. This ap-
proach is also detailed in box 2. Both series are illus-
trated in figure 2 overleaf, together with the original
data on aggregate consumption from figure 1. The41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
average deviation ε t is 1.9 percent using DeLong and
Summers’ approach and 1.6 percent using the series
interpolated from NBER peaks. The cost of business
cycles turns out to be roughly equal to this average,
so these magnitudes also represent the amount individ-
uals would sacrifice to attain 
*. t C  In closely related
work, Cohen (2000) finds a slightly smaller cost of
business cycles of 1 percent, still much larger than
the cost Lucas calculated.
The difference between Lucas’s estimate and the
one that emerges from DeLong and Summers’ analy-
sis stems from their different views of stabilization.
Which of these is more compelling? Each imposes
what it views as reasonable assumptions on the devi-
ation ε t between actual consumption and its level after
stabilization to estimate 
*. t C  But a more compelling
approach would be to derive 
*
t C  using economic the-
ory, rather than imposing ad-hoc restrictions on ε t, to
recover 
*
t C  and let the theory dictate whether the level
of consumption following stabilization will be higher
than average consumption in the cyclical economy.
One explanation for why stabilization should in-
crease consumption is that shocks affect the economy
asymmetrically: Positive shocks boost economic ac-
tivity less than negative shocks dampen it.12 Mankiw
(1988) and Yellen and Akerlof (2004) sketch out such
an argument and cite evidence that unemployment
responds asymmetrically to changes in inflation,
suggesting that if the Federal Reserve were able to
stabilize inflation at its average level, unemployment
would fall and more output could be produced and
consumed. Mankiw estimates that stabilization should
increase output on average by about 0.5 percent per
year, while Yellen and Akerlof’s estimates suggest
output would increase by between 0.5 percent and
0.8 percent. On a similar theme, Gali, Gertler, and
BOX 2
Estimating potential consumption, C*
t
Consider a process  ()
* 1 tt t CC =+ ε  where ε t ≤  0 and where the probability that ε t = 0 is strictly positive.
In addition, suppose that 
**
1 . tt CC + =λ  We observe data on Ct and want to use it to estimate 
*. t C
DeLong and Summers (1988) suggest the following recursive approach for estimating
*. t C  In the first
year of the sample, define 
















where k is an arbitrary integer. DeLong and Summers suggest setting k = 3, 5, and 8. Figure 2 is illustrated
using k = 8. By construction, this series will satisfy 
* , tt CC ≥  consistent with the restriction that ε t ≤  0. One
can show that this approach will yield a consistent estimate for 
*
t C  for large t as long as we use a sufficiently
large value of k.
An alternative approach relies on using additional information that identifies periods in which ε t = 0.
Let t1, t2, … tn denote years in which the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle
committee identifies a business cycle peak. These periods are assumed to correspond to years in which ε t = 0.
For any t, define  () { } () { }
1t o 1t o max and min , ii in in tt t tt t
= = τ= < τ= > that is,  ( ) t τ  reflects the most recent business
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To the extent that NBER dates identify true peaks (that is, periods where ε t = 0), we would be assured that
* . tt CC ≥  In practice, this approach yields exceptions for which 
*. tt CC >  Note that this approach remains valid
even if the growth rate 
**
1/ tt CC + λ=  varies between business cycle peaks, whereas the approach suggested by
DeLong and Summers may not. Figure 2 uses all years in which the NBER dating committee identifies a
business cycle peak, with the exception of January 1981, which follows a trough six months earlier in July
1980. This recovery was likely too short for the economy to have returned to its potential, that is, it is unlike-
ly that ε t = 0 in 1981. A similar problem may arise in some of the early years of the sample, especially given
that in some of those years the implied value of ε t is positive.42 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 2
Log consumption per capita, 1948–2003
Stabilization corresponds to filling in troughs
Sources: Consumption data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis;

















Lopez-Salido (2003) develop a formal
model in which market frictions imply
that welfare (and under certain assump-
tions, consumption) responds asymmetri-
cally to employment fluctuations. They
find that a policy that stabilizes employ-
ment would increase welfare by an
amount equivalent to increasing lifetime
consumption by between 0.30 percent
and 0.75 percent.
Ramey and Ramey (1991) suggest
another explanation for why stabilization
ought to increase the average level of
consumption. Their argument is based on
the notion that firms need to pre-commit
to a specific technology before they com-
mence production. In an uncertain envi-
ronment, firms may end up with a
technology that is inappropriate for the
scale of production they would have to
undertake. Thus, volatile environments
are more likely to involve inefficient production, re-
sulting in lower average output. Ramey and Ramey
estimate that fluctuations lower output by 1.7 percent
on average, although they also note that if house-
holds are risk-averse they will sacrifice slightly more
than this to avoid fluctuations. This is on par with the
magnitudes suggested by DeLong and Summers.13
A third reason stabilization might change the
level of consumption concerns its effect on capital
accumulation. If individuals accumulate more capital
in the stable environment, there will be more inputs
available for production in the long run and, thus,
average output will eventually be higher than in the
volatile environment. However, as I discuss in more
detail in the next section, the theoretical effects of
stabilization on the capital stock are ambiguous; in-
vestment can either rise or fall in response to stabili-
zation. For now, I simply note that the welfare effects
associated with such changes are negligible and would
not contribute much to the cost of business cycles. But
the other explanations for why stabilization ought to
increase average consumption suggest a cost of busi-
ness cycles as large as 2 percent.
The effects of volatility on consumption
growth
The previous section focused on scenarios in
which eliminating fluctuations increases the level of
consumption. Graphically, this implies that stabiliza-
tion induces a parallel shift up in consumption from
the path Lucas assumed, which is displayed in figure 1.
But eliminating fluctuations may also affect the growth
rate of consumption. I now discuss work that explores
this possibility.
The most commonly cited reason stabilization
should affect consumption growth concerns its effect
on investment. The intuition for this is as follows:
Since firms are likely to be more cautious about in-
vesting in uncertain environments, eliminating fluc-
tuations should lead firms to accumulate capital more
rapidly. This allows firms to produce more output, en-
abling households to enjoy more consumption and, pre-
sumably, making them better off. However, as I now
explain, this line of reasoning turns out to be misleading.
First, eliminating volatility can just as plausibly
discourage investment as encourage it. For example,
recall that in the face of volatility, households choose
to maintain precautionary savings to sustain them
through periods of low earnings. Stabilization would
mitigate the need for such savings. As savings become
scarcer, interest rates would rise and might discour-
age firms from investing.14 But even if stabilization
encourages investment, the resulting increase in con-
sumption growth comes at a cost. This is because in-
vestment uses up resources that would otherwise have
been used to produce consumption goods, so house-
holds get to enjoy less initial consumption. Whether
households are better off under faster growth is there-
fore ambiguous.
To put it another way, the effects of stabilization
on investment do not reflect a simple change in the
rate at which consumption grows; rather, they in-
volve changes in the trade-off between present and
future consumption. In a well-functioning economy43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
where households act in their own best
interest, changes in this trade-off ought
to reflect the preferences of households
and, as such, make them better off.
Hence, assuming trend consumption re-
mains unchanged once the economy is
stabilized ignores an implicit benefit
from stabilization. But this benefit is
likely to be modest, given that house-
holds already chose their consumption
optimally in the volatile environment. In
fact, when Matheron and Maury (2000)
and Epaulard and Pommeret (2003) cal-
culate the welfare cost of business cycles
due to their effects on investment, they
find effects of no more than 0.5 percent.
The reason an increase in investment
has such a small effect on welfare is that
most of the benefits from the faster
growth it gives rise to are offset by lower
initial consumption. But Barlevy (2004a)
argues that eliminating fluctuations can increase con-
sumption growth even when initial consumption is
unchanged. This is because changes in investment af-
fect growth asymmetrically; an increase in invest-
ment increases growth less than a similar decrease in
investment decreases growth, reflecting among other
things the inability of firms to undertake too many in-
vestment projects at once. In this case, simply elimi-
nating fluctuations in investment without ever
changing the level of investment should increase
growth. Estimates reported in that paper suggest that
if stabilization would steady investment at its aver-
age level, the growth rate of per-capita consumption
would increase from 2 percent per year to about 2.35
percent per year, which is well within the range of
historical variation in trend consumption growth.
Figure 3 illustrates how trend consumption 
*
t C
from figure 1 would change if, in addition to no
longer fluctuating around its trend, consumption
grew by an additional 0.35 percentage points per
year. Although the effect on growth is modest, its cu-
mulative effects are large, and households would pre-
sumably significantly prefer this new consumption
path. Indeed, Barlevy (2004a) estimates the cost of
cycles due to their effect on growth at 7.5–8.0 per-
cent of lifetime consumption, much larger than the
cost of business cycles described so far.
Note that figure 3 assumes stabilization has no
effect on average investment. But recall that stabili-
zation might also lead to a change in the level of in-
vestment, so consumption may be steeper or flatter
than captured by the figure. However, as noted earlier,
in a well-functioning economy, changes in the trade-
off between present and future consumption will only
be to the benefit of households. In that case, house-
holds should be at least as well off without cycles as
with the consumption path depicted in figure 3, even
if stabilization causes investment to fall by enough to
lead to a lower overall growth rate. What matters is
not whether consumption actually grows more rapid-
ly in the absence of fluctuations, but that stabilization
makes it possible to grow more rapidly from the same
amount of resources.
In the opposite direction, various papers have ar-
gued that business cycles facilitate rather than depress
growth. One hypothesis relies on the idea of intertem-
poral substitution; firms can take advantage of the
fact that productivity is lower in recessions to under-
take growth-enhancing activities without having to
sacrifice as much output. While there is some truth to
this, Barlevy (2004b) argues that one of the main in-
puts into productivity growth, research and develop-
ment, is concentrated precisely when its opportunity
cost in terms of foregone output is highest, that is, in
booms. Thus, at least with respect to research and de-
velopment, business cycles force society to trade off
present and future consumption less favorably, not
more favorably, imposing a social cost that is estimated
to equal 0.3 percent of lifetime consumption. This
reinforces rather than contradicts the view that busi-
ness cycles retard the economy’s growth potential, in
this case by increasing the amount of foregone output
required to achieve growth.
FIGURE 3
Log consumption per capita, 1948–2003
Stabilization affects trend growth
Sources: Consumption data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
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Shleifer (1986) offers a separate argument for why
volatility might be essential for growth. His reasoning
is that firms invest in developing new technologies to
earn excess profits. If stabilization eliminates periods
of high profits, it may discourage investment and growth.
Shleifer develops an illustrative example in which the
absence of fluctuations leaves the economy stagnant.
Since the economy operates inefficiently in his model,
the argument that changes in investment make house-
holds better does not apply, and the falloff in investment
makes households worse off. However, recall from the
previous section that stabilization is also likely to increase
the level of economic activity and with it average
profits. This partly mitigates the concern that stabili-
zation would suppress the incentives to innovate.
Finally, Jovanovic (2004) argues that volatility is
an unavoidable byproduct of growth, so stabilization
may curtail growth. His argument is that growth in-
volves experimentation: Firms try out new ideas, some
of which fail spectacularly. If the only way to stabilize
the economy is to preclude such experimentation, stabi-
lization may lead to stagnation. However, it is not ob-
vious that stabilization would necessitate suspending
experimentation, as opposed to moderating the nega-
tive consequences of failure. Indeed, in Jovanovic’s
model, reducing the volatility that results from exper-
imentation would both facilitate growth and make
society better off.
Taking stock: How costly is postwar volatility?
Taken together, the research that followed up on
Lucas’s original insight regarding the cost of postwar
U.S. business cycles has raised important shortcomings
in his approach. On the one hand, Lucas correctly point-
ed out that aggregate consumption does not fluctuate
very much over the business cycle, so an individual
household whose consumption mirrored aggregate
consumption would not be much better off if these
fluctuations were smoothed out. This conclusion proves
to be robust. But in a world with imperfect credit mar-
kets, the consumption of individual households may be
far more volatile than aggregate consumption, and as
such they would benefit more from eliminating macro-
economic volatility. Even when we take into account
wealthier households that are not much affected by
business cycles, the average cost to society can be as
large as 2.5 percent of aggregate consumption per year.
Beyond the direct cost of consumption volatility,
there is evidence that business cycles impose an even
larger indirect cost through their effect on the level and
growth rate of economic activity. That is, living in a
volatile world not only forces households to contend
with unpredictable consumption, but also to consume
less than they would otherwise. These costs are not
mutually exclusive of the cost of higher uncertainty,
so the true cost of business cycles relative to a world
with no fluctuations should be the sum total of these
costs. The final tab comes to over 10 percent of life-
time consumption, an unquestionably large cost.
The costs are based entirely on the way business
cycles impact consumption. But as various commen-
tators have noted, business cycles might be costly in
other ways as well. For example, they may force house-
holds to work a different number of hours each, some-
thing they may be just as reluctant to do as varying
their consumption over time. Likewise, business cy-
cles may make households anxious about the prospect
of earnings losses, even those whose incomes are spared.
There is probably some truth to these arguments.
However, one can easily fall into the trap of adopting
a utopian view of what stabilization can achieve.
By restricting attention to the fairly conventional
and, more importantly, measurable ways by which
business cycles affect consumption, the work surveyed
above makes a compelling case that postwar business
cycles were quite costly after all.
Policy implications: Is stabilization an
important priority?
The fact that postwar business cycles were so
costly raises two immediate questions for policymakers.
First, should policymakers have acted more aggressively
to stabilize the economy during this period than they
actually did? And second, is stabilization an important
priority that should guide policymakers, as current law
dictates? I now argue that despite the apparently large
costs of business cycles over the postwar period, it is
far from obvious that society would have been much
better off if policymakers had pursued a more aggressive
stabilization, since at least some of the shocks that were
responsible for cyclical fluctuations over this period
could not have been easily offset. At the same time, the
fact that even modest amounts of volatility can impose
such a large social cost reaffirms that stable growth
should be an important goal for policymakers. In other
words, even if it is not possible to defend against all
sources of volatility, including potentially those respon-
sible for much of the volatility during the postwar
period, preventing the economy from becoming even
more volatile should certainly rank as a high priority.
In his original monograph, Lucas reasoned that
since the cost of business cycles is so small, there is
little to be gained from further stabilization. In revis-
iting his estimates, some of the papers cited above
have argued that the inverse is also true, that is, the
fact that the implied cost of business cycles is so45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
large implies that the benefits to more aggressive sta-
bilization must be substantial. But just because busi-
ness cycles are costly does not automatically imply
that stabilization is desirable; instead, that depends on
what causes business cycle fluctuations, what tools
are available to policymakers, and whether these tools
can effectively offset the underlying shocks. Even if
Lucas’s original calculation understates the cost of
business cycles, his conclusion that further stabiliza-
tion is unwarranted may very well hold true.
In his recent review article, Lucas (2003) argues
that evidence on the nature of cyclical fluctuations
over the postwar period suggests there was very little
scope for policymakers to pursue stabilization more
aggressively. Reviewing the evidence on the sources
of output volatility during the postwar period, he
finds that at most one-third of the variation in output
can be attributed to monetary shocks, which the Fed-
eral Reserve presumably has the best chance of off-
setting. The remaining 70 percent of output volatility
is due to changes in real economic variables. For ex-
ample, one shock to real economic variables during
this period was the sharp increase in oil prices in the
1970s. A dramatic run-up in the price of oil raises
production costs and affects the economy’s potential
for producing goods in the short run, that is, as long
as existing production technologies are still in place.
In this case, there is probably little that policymakers
can do to successfully stabilize the economy. At best,
they can try to offset the shock by lowering other as-
pects of production costs, but such intervention can
easily do more harm than good by distorting firms’
incentives to abandon more costly energy-intensive
technologies. In fact, one can formally show that, at
least under certain assumptions, policymakers should
not try to offset exogenous fluctuations in real eco-
nomic variables. Assuming these assumptions were
met, policymakers would have at best been able to
reduce macroeconomic volatility by one-third, and
the benefits to pursuing more aggressive stabilization
would be far more modest than the implied cost of
aggregate fluctuations.
However, one has to be careful in interpreting
evidence on the source of fluctuations. For example,
consider fluctuations in aggregate productivity over
the business cycle. These would be counted as fluc-
tuations in real as opposed to monetary factors. As
pointed out above, if these changes are driven by
technological considerations, for example, changes
in the economic environment that affect the viability
of existing technologies such as a change in the rela-
tive price of a key input like oil, there may be little
policymakers can do. But fluctuations in aggregate
productivity might instead reflect fluctuations in vari-
ables that policymakers could affect. For example,
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) develop a model in which
if firms are optimistic about economic conditions,
they will choose to operate at a larger scale, which in
turn contributes to raising aggregate productivity and
reaffirms their decision to operate at a larger scale. But
if firms are pessimistic about economic conditions,
they will choose to operate at a smaller scale, resulting
in lower aggregate productivity. In this case, policy-
makers might be able to credibly announce policies
that dissuade firms from being pessimistic; for exam-
ple, they might pledge to pursue an accommodative
policy if productivity were low. If firms find it opti-
mal to expand their scale under easy monetary poli-
cy, such a policy would preclude the economy from
settling at a low level of productivity. Policymakers
could then stabilize fluctuations by affecting expecta-
tions, a point Benhabib and Farmer themselves allude
to. The extent to which the large cost of postwar busi-
ness cycles could have been avoided through prudent
policy thus depends on what forces were responsible
for this volatility in the first place.
Without further research as to the underlying source
of business cycle fluctuations, then, we cannot reject
Lucas’s conclusion that there was little to be gained
from pursuing a more aggressive stabilization over
this period. Nevertheless, the fact that even small
amounts of volatility are of such great consequence
suggests that the answer to our question whether sta-
bilization should rank as a high priority for policy-
makers is yes. Lucas himself was careful in his original
monograph to argue that while there is little to gain
from eliminating residual risk above and beyond
whatever stabilization policies were already being
pursued at the time, this does not invalidate the po-
tentially grave importance of existing stabilization
policies. For example, he readily acknowledged in
his monograph that “fluctuations at the pre-Second
World War level, especially combined as they were
with an absence of adequate programs for social in-
surance, were associated with large costs in welfare.”
This is confirmed in recent work by Chatterjee and
Corbae (2001), who show that the same calculation
by Imorohoroglu (1989) that yields such small costs
of business cycles for the postwar period implies in-
dividuals should have been willing to sacrifice more
than 6 percent of lifetime consumption to avoid pro-
longed episodes such as the Great Depression, since
very long unemployment spells are very costly. Incor-
porating the other features described in this survey
would magnify this cost even more. To the extent
that the alternative to the stabilization policies that46 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
were pursued in the postwar period was the risk of
another Great Depression, there can be no dispute
that prudent policies that keep the economy relative-
ly stable are an important priority, especially given
the argument advanced by some that it was bad policies
that either exacerbated or prolonged the Depression.15
That said, one does not need the extreme of the
Great Depression to appreciate the benefits inherent
in stabilization policy. As the work surveyed in this
article reveals, even a modest amount of macroeco-
nomic volatility can impose significant social costs.
The fact that there are some shocks policymakers are
unable to do much about, and that such shocks may
have accounted for a significant share of the macro-
economic volatility during the postwar period, does
not take away from the observation that households
are likely to be significantly better off in stable envi-
ronments than in volatile ones. Even if policymakers
were not in a position to stabilize much more aggres-
sively than they did during the postwar period, they
may still have played an important role in safeguard-
ing the economy from any additional shocks that
would have made output even more volatile.
Conclusion
Economists are split as to whether postwar busi-
ness cycles were costly. On the one hand, there are
those who accepted Lucas’s original conclusion, a
view reinforced by early work that appeared to con-
firm his results even after accounting for greater de-
grees of risk aversion and the fact that credit markets
provide only incomplete protection against earnings
risk. On the other side are those who from the outset
dismissed Lucas’s conclusion as implausible and re-
mained convinced that stabilization is an important
policy goal, even if they didn’t always offer much to
directly counter his argument. This article argues that
more recent work that explores particular features
absent from Lucas’s calculation reveals that postwar
business cycles were in fact costly, but that this does
not necessarily imply that more aggressive stabiliza-
tion during this period was warranted. Determining
whether policymakers should have acted more aggres-
sively requires a better understanding of what forces
are ultimately responsible for business cycle fluctua-
tions, a difficult question that economists are slowly
but surely making progress on. But even if ultimately
there wasn’t much more that policymakers could
have done to further insulate the economy from cy-
clical shocks during this period, maintaining a stable
growth path as mandated by the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 does appear to be
a highly desirable goal. To the extent that policymakers
prevented the economy from being even more volatile
during this period, then, they deserve great credit.47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1Two other recent surveys are Lucas (2003) and Yellen and
Akerlof (2004). Each reaches a somewhat different conclusion
than the present survey on at least one of these questions.
2Subsequent work has argued for omitting expenditures on
durables, since utility depends on the total outstanding stock of
durable goods rather than on the amount of durable goods pur-
chased in the current year. The implied cost of volatility using
nondurable consumption is not dramatically different.
3That is, 
* {} t C  is the Hodrick–Prescott filter of the original con-
sumption series {Ct}. Since I estimate this from annual data, I use
a weight of 100. Lucas’s original calculation was based on quar-
terly data.
4Campbell and Cochrane (1995) similarly argue the equity premium
implies a large cost of business cycles.
5DiTella, MacColloch, and Oswald (2003) and Wolfers (2003)
propose using survey data on how happy people feel as another
way of estimating the cost of cycles without imposing a particular
utility function. For example, Wolfers regresses well-being data
on the mean and variance of unemployment to arrive at a tradeoff
between the two. One could do the same with the mean and vari-
ance of consumption; however, while consumption grows over
time, average reported well-being does not. This incongruity sug-
gests either individuals do not strongly prefer more consumption
to less or, more likely, that well-being measures are not directly
comparable over time.
6However, it is possible to disaggregate consumption at the level of
individual states, as in Robe and Pallage (2002). They find that re-
tail sales at the state level are more volatile than at the national level,
suggesting the effects of macroeconomic shocks are concentrated
among a subset of states. Accordingly, the cost of volatility they
find is somewhat larger than Lucas computed from total U.S. data.
7Atkeson and Phelan do not deny that unemployment duration
varies over the cycle; rather, they argue stabilization makes long
spells less likely to occur at the same time others experience long
spells, rather than less likely to occur at all. Which view is more
reasonable depends on the underlying model and the nature of
stabilization.
8The 2002 paper is a revised version of their 1999 paper; my dis-
cussion is based on the 2002 version.
9There appears to be some confusion about this in the literature.
Several papers claim that Storesletten et al. assume earnings
shocks are permanent, when in fact they do not.
10Turnovsky and Bianconi (2005) also consider a model where
shocks are permanent. But they assume stabilization reduces the
average level of volatility rather than its variation over time. More-
over, they allow households to vary their labor supply in response
to shocks. Their estimate for the cost of cycles is about 2 percent.
11Several papers claim Beaudry and Pages obtain large costs be-
cause they assume stabilization eliminates all idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk. While it is true that workers in their model face no risk
in the stable economy, Beaudry and Pages calibrate the earnings
loss workers suffer in their model to the extra amount workers
lose when they are laid off in recessions as opposed to booms,
not the (much larger) amount workers lose whenever they are laid
off. In particular, workers who are laid off in booms in their model
experience no wage losses. Thus, their welfare estimates only re-
flect the gains from eliminating the cyclical part of idiosyncratic
risk, not the gains from eliminating all idiosyncratic earnings risk.
12Technically, this asymmetry corresponds to the notion that consump-
tion is a concave function of whatever variable is being stabilized.
13Portier and Puch (2004) make a similar point, although in their
framework firms commit to a price rather than to a technology.
While they demonstrate that this commitment magnifies the cost
of business cycles, they view their model as too stylized to yield
informative estimates for the true cost of business cycles.
14Even ignoring precautionary savings, uncertainty may encour-
age rather than discourage firms from investing. With more vola-
tility, profits will be higher if uncertainty is resolved favorably
but no lower if uncertainty is resolved unfavorably, as long as
firms can cut their losses by shutting down or adjusting their labor
hiring. While this point has long been recognized in the investment
literature, it has not figured much in work on the cost of business
cycles, where the notion that firms can cut their losses is typically
ignored.
15Chatterjee and Corbae’s estimates assume policy did not change
between the postwar and prewar period. However, since their re-
sults assume downturns of the magnitude of the Great Depression
are rare, given that they failed to occur in the postwar period, their
6 percent would represent a lower bound on the true cost of elimi-
nating these crises.48 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
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